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AN ETERNAL CON
RANDALL G. MCCUTCHEON
Abstract. Cian Dorr considered the case of a fair coin that is tossed every day
throughout an innite past and an innite future (an \Eternal Coin"). Against
intuition, he argued that, conditional on the Coin having landed heads throughout
the past, one should believe, with full probability, that it will also land heads today.
In this paper, we critique Dorr's arguments, as well as part of a reply by Myrvold.
1. The Eternal Coin, Revisited
Cian Dorr (2010) invites us to consider an \Eternal Coin".1 This is a coin that
has been tossed every day throughout an innite past, will be tossed today and will
continue to be tossed, once per day, throughout an innite future. The Coin is fair,
the tosses are independent (everything to come is conditional on these facts) and
we know that we will never have any information about the outcomes of the tosses.
Consider the propositions
H: The Coin lands heads today.
P : The Coin landed heads on every past day.
F : The Coin will land heads on every future day.
Dorr argues that the rational conditional credences to hold are Cr(HjP ) = Cr(HjF ) =
1. (Call this position ONE.) Our purpose is to show that Dorr's arguments do noth-
ing to defeat the presumption that Cr(HjP ) = Cr(HjF ) = 1
2
. (Call this position
HALF.) A further question is whether HALF is worth adopting, or if rather these
conditional credences are better left undened. (Undened is cleaner, though for the
related problem of conditionalization on the most natural ff-algebra, we will say 1
2
.)
First we argue against the conclusion of ONE directly. Suppose there are two inde-
pendent Eternal Coins (Coins A and B), and a third coin (Coin C). Each day, Coin
C is placed in the heads position if and only if the outcomes of that day's Coin A
and Coin B tosses coincide. Coin C's outcomes constitute a 1
2
  1
2
IID (as with the
original Coin, the random variables governing the placements are independent and
identically distributed) process. Accordingly, an advocate for ONE is committed to
1This ill-fated paper is an essentially unedited amalgamation of an initial submission and revision
written for Erkenntnis in 2017. \Ill-fated" not because it was rejected, but because I had naively
assumed (see footnote 8 below) that Dorr was implicitly conditioning on the most natural ff-algebra,
and I had believed (as I still do) that the answer to that puzzle should be 1
2
(in particular dened,
contra Myrvold 2015). Appraised of Dorr's true intention by referees, I soon realized that the
argument at the end of the text below (cf. Builes 2019, where the same argument is presented
with dierent emphasis) commits the 1
2
solution to the problem Dorr did in fact pose to mere nite
additivity (and so isn't acceptable). A thematically consistent revision was therefore impossible.
1
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holding that, conditional on Coin C having been placed heads throughout the past,
it will almost surely be placed heads today.
This result is not comforting. For as Dorr acknowledges, there is good enough reason
to think that one should have full credence in the proposition that the actual past
ff (a function from the negative integers to f0; 1g; ff( n) = 1 if and only if the coin
in question landed heads n days ago) of Coin A is such that, conditional on it, one
would have credence 1
2
in Coin A's landing heads today. So if the ONE advocate
were to rst learn that the pasts ffA and ffB were the same (thus coming to believe,
with full probability, that Coins A and B coincide today), then were to next learn
the common value of the pasts ffA = ffB, she would almost surely (by Reection, say)
have come to believe that two independent, 1
2
  1
2
Bernoulli random variables (those
governing today's A and B tosses) agree almost surely. Given the transparency of
the situation (self-locating eects, if any, ought to have manifested in the individual
Bernoulli variables), that is absurd.
We turn now to Dorr's arguments. Consider rst an argument from self-locating
reference:
Take any jointly inconsistent centred propositions A and B that agree
about what the world is like as a whole and who you are, and disagree
only about when it is. Suppose that if either A and B is ever true of
you, each must be true of you for the same length of time - e.g. one day.
And suppose that your evidence does nothing to discriminate between
A and B, in the sense that a priori you should regard it as no more or
less likely given A than given B. Then you should regard A and B as
equally likely, in the strong sense: conditional on A_B, your credences
in A and in B should be equal.
Dorr now lets K0 be the centered proposition today is the last Tails day preceding an
innite nal run of Heads, and lets Ki be the centered proposition today is the ith
day of an innite nal run of Heads, i = 1; 2; : : :. By the above indierence principle,
Cr(K0jK0 _K1 _    _Kn) =
1
n+ 1
for each n, from which it follows that Cr(K0jK0 _K1 _    ) = 0. And from here, of
course, it is not far to the conclusion that Cr(HjF ) = 1.
We claim that the argument from self-locating reference overgeneralizes. Let F
be the proposition that the future of the Coin is equal to some tail of the binary
expansion of  (with 1 for heads and 0 for tails), and let F 0

be the proposition that
the present and the future of the Coin taken together are equal to some tail of the
binary expansion of . Let L0 be the centered proposition today is the last day
preceding a maximal innite nal run equal to some tail of the binary expansion of
, and let Li be the centered proposition today is the ith day of a maximal innite
nal run equal to some tail of the binary expansion of , i = 1; 2; : : :. Again by the
indierence principle,
Cr(L0jL0 _ L1 _    _ Ln) =
1
n+ 1
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for each n, from which it follows that Cr(L0jL0 _ L1 _    ) = 0, implying that
Cr(F 0

jF) = 1. In other words, the Coin is to be expected to eerily continue (into
the past) any serendipitous mirroring of . This appears to be in tension with Dorr's
later claim that for a \typical past", with \no interesting periodic behaviour", there
is \nothing to defeat the presumption" that rational credence in heads ought to be
1
2
, conditional on that past.
Moreover, were one to rst learn F (and so come to have credence 1 in F
0

), and
then learn the future trajectory of the Coin, one would, assuming one were well
enough acquainted with the binary expansion of , almost surely (Reection, again)
have come to possess an extreme credence in the outcome of today's toss. This is
especially strange in that one could at this point reect on the fact that there is
nothing special about  here; one might well have started the thought experiment
with some number having a binary expansion last diering from that of  at the place
corresponding to today's toss.
Dorr considers a counterproposal, according to which one should arm
Cr(Kn+kjKn+k _Kn) =
1
2k + 1
;
but neglects drawing out its more compelling features. A strong case can be made
by considering how Ki constrains tosses in the vicinity of today's. K1, for exam-
ple, constrains yesterday's toss (tails), today's toss (heads), and every future toss
(heads). K2 also constrains yesterday's toss (heads), today's toss (heads), and every
future toss (heads), but it also constrains the day before yesterday's toss (tails). So
there is plausible reason to deem K2 \one-half as likely as K1, conditional on their
disjunction".
Next consider an argument from evolving credences. Let Cr denote the credence
function you have today, and let Cr+ be the credence function you will have tomorrow.
Dorr accepts the following as premises:
a. Cr+(HF jP _HF ) = Cr(F jHP _ F )
b. Cr+(P jP _HF ) = Cr(HP jHP _ F )
c. Cr+(HF jP _HF ) = Cr(HF jP _HF )
d. Cr+(P jP _HF ) = Cr(P jP _HF )
e. Cr(P jP _ F ) > 0
f. Cr(F jP _ F ) > 0
Dorr refers to premises a. and b. as UPDATING, to premises c. and d. as CON-
STANCY and to premises e. and f. as POSITIVITY. From them (as well as some
innocuous assumptions about the algebra of conditional probabilities), he derives
Cr(HjP ) = Cr(HjF ) = 1.
In a \preliminary defense" of the CONSTANCY premises, Dorr asserts that since
one's total evidence \does not change in any relevant way between today and tomor-
row", one's conditional credences in centered propositions about the Coin should not
change either. To the charge that mere passage of time constitutes relevant evidence,
he oers the following:
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...in an ordinary case where the passage of time diminishes your cre-
dence in the centred proposition it is raining, your evidence today may
include the centred proposition it is raining right now...while your evi-
dence tomorrow instead includes the centred proposition it was raining
yesterday.... Nothing like this happens with the Coin.
This comparison is misleading. It is raining is plainly analogous to the Coin lands
heads today, not to the Coin has always landed heads. The latter is analogous to it
has always been raining, and there isn't any reason to believe that the passage of time
should be irrelevant to one's conditional credences about that centered proposition
in a case where rain behavior is stipulated to arise from an IID process.
In a \further defense" of the CONSTANCY premises, Dorr paints the following pic-
ture of one aspect of HALF reasoning:
As time goes on, you regard HF as more and more likely relative to P .
(...) If the ratio of your credences in HF and P , conditional on their
disjunction, is x today, tomorrow it will be 4x. (...) You spend almost
all of your life regarding one of P and HF as vastly more likely than
the other.
It is intended that this narrative be damning, but we think it's potentially more
the opposite, not least because if the Coin were tossed a very large nite number
of times and one's (much shorter, say) lifespan were to be situated uniformly at
random inside that interval, that (or something very close to that) is just how one's
conditional credences would in fact evolve.
From the initial defense of the POSITIVITY premises, meanwhile: \For POSITIVI-
TY to fail would be for you to regard one of F and P as innitely more likely than
the other. Such a bias seems odd, given the symmetry of the setup." But the more
promising option is to leave the conditional credences Cr(P jP _F ) and Cr(F jP _F )
undened. Indeed, there seems to us to be good reason for doing so.2 Dorr writes:
Compare the present case to one where innitely many Coins are tossed
simultaneously, in an innite row of houses running East-West. In that
case, it would be crazy to regard Heads in every house to the East of
me as innitely more or less likely than Heads in every house to the
West of me. Why should it be any dierent when the distribution is
temporal rather than spatial?
2Noting that HALF defenders must allow some instances of conditionalization on null events,
Dorr writes \...perhaps there is something special...which prevents Cr(P jP _ F )...from being well-
dened." One might point to chances, which feature so crucially in the argument for HALF. There
doesn't, to us, seem to be a fact of the matter about the relative chances of P and F , conditional
on their disjunction, whereas the chance of H conditional on P is 1
2
by stipulation. (The tosses
are independent and the Coin is fair.) But even if there are non-trivial chances, then surely they
evolve in the \counterintuitive" way envisioned by Dorr in his argument for CONSTANCY, so that
there would be a unique rst day at which jCh(P jP _F )  1
2
j achieved its minimum value. Saddled
then with merely nitely additive credences over the possible values of one's displacement from that
unique day, we wouldn't know how to compute the expectation of these chances.
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Suppose one regards \Heads East" and \Heads West" as equally likely conditional on
their disjunction. One concern is what would happen if one were to now (say) burn
down every second house to the East, put the remaining houses on trucks to ll in the
gaps, and toss again. On the one hand the picture prior to the second toss looks just
like the picture prior to the rst toss; there are innitely many houses to the East and
innitely many houses to the West. So perhaps one ought to regard \Heads East, 2nd
toss" and \Heads West, 2nd toss" as equally likely, conditional on their disjunction.
On the other hand, the Coins in the houses to the East that are being tossed the
second time are precisely those that were in odd numbered (say) houses to the East
the rst time. So perhaps one ought to regard \Heads East, 2nd toss" as innitely
more likely than \Heads West, 2nd toss", conditional on their disjunction. (As one is
already committed to regarding \Heads East, odd house numbers" as innitely more
likely than \Heads West", conditional on their disjunction.)
The closest thing to a \smoking gun" passage in Dorr (2010) is this, in which are
contemplated worlds that contain, in addition to an Eternal Coin, a gong that rings
just once.
There are at least two dierent ways to set up a conditional chance
function over such worlds, each of which has a claim to represent the
Coin as fair, the gong as equally likely to ring on any given day, and
the two as independent. Roughly speaking, we could either start with a
conditional probability function over propositions about how the Coin
lands each day and then ne-grain its domain to include propositions
about the gong, or else we could start with a conditional probability
function over propositions about when the gong rings and then ne-
grain its domain to include propositions about the Coin.
To start, we don't think that Dorr is suciently wary of the problems caused by
the violations of countable additivity brought on by one's own displacement from
the ringing of such a gong. To bring them into relief, suppose there are two such
gongs and that you are oered your choice of them, winning 2 dollars if the ringing
of the one you choose has greater (in magnitude) displacement than the other from
your current position. Once you choose, it's understood that you will learn the
displacement of the ringing of the gong you chose from your current position and be
oered the opportunity to switch...at a cost of one dollar. Since upon learning the
displacement of the gong you chose from your current position you will come to have
credence 1 that the other's ring will have a greater magnitude displacement from
your current position, you will denitely pay the dollar to switch. But you know all
of this in advance, so you will just keep your dollar and choose the other gong in the
rst place. Until, that is, you realize that the same argument blocks the choosing of
that gong as well.
We think there is a way to run the chance function debate in such a way that at
least one of the two options (the stronger, we think) avoids any run-in with mere
nite additivity. So far as we can tell, the gong serves two purposes. The rst is to
provide (in the case of the \gong rst" chance function) a center of reference around
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which to build a Coin measure. E.g. heads the day the gong rings gets measure one-
half, heads the day the gong rings and tails the day after gets measure one-quarter,
etc. That purpose can easily be served (indeed usually is served) by some designated
position dened in relation to one's current location, so that heads today gets measure
one-half, heads today and tails tomorrow gets measure one-quarter, etc.
The second purpose served by the gong is to provide evidence that distinguishes to-
day from every other day, e.g. the gong rang today or the gong rang the day before
yesterday. However, one may endow today with such evidence by postulating and
conditioning on irrelevant, almost sure position-specifying evidence such as the com-
plete trajectory (relative to today) of a second, independent Eternal Coin.3 Almost
surely this trajectory will not be periodic, in which case its landscape of tosses will
look dierent from today's perspective than it does from any other day's.
We can now draw out the dierences between our position and Dorr's. Suppose one
learns P . Imagine next two hypothetical completions of the Coin's trajectory. On the
rst, the Coin lands heads seventeen more times (starting today) and then recreates
the binary expansion of . On the second, the Coin immediately recreates the binary
expansion of  (starting today). We believe that Dorr would say that these two
evidential scenarios \agree about what the world is like as a whole".4 We disagree;
they discriminate between two dierent worlds. Concomitantly, we advocate for a
\self-location rst" chance function.
One way to characterize this disagreement might be to say that we treat today as
a rigid designator. The device of a second Coin brings this to light; in the second
scenario (but not the rst), the Coin's mirroring of the binary expansion of  begins
on the day at which the past of the second Coin is equal to the second Coin's actual
past now. That is, it begins today.
This discussion does, however, suggest an attempt to establish that Cr(HjN) =
1 for some heads-dominated null set N of trajectories determined by behavior on
coordinates other than that of today, namely by choosing an N that is a set of
uncentered worlds in the coin-rst sense, i.e. a shift-invariant set. The resulting
credence functions Cr(jN) tend to fail countable additivity, and in some cases it
may be possible to prevent this by stipulating that Cr(HjN) = 1. To illustrate the
sort of countable additivity failure we have in mind, let O be the null event the Coin
lands tails exactly once, ever. (O is sensitive to behavior of the Coin today, but it
3Dorr contemplates eliminating the trouble he perceives that evidence distinguishing today from
every other day makes for ONE by brutely stipulating \that you have no such distinguishing evidence
about today". Such a stipulation would not aect our case because it isn't necessary to observe
that the trajectory of the second Coin is  (a function from the integers into f0; 1g) in order to
conditionalize on the trajectory of the second Coin being  (any more than it is necessary to observe
that P in order to conditionalize on P , e.g.), and to conditionalize on such a trajectory involves
treating it as hypothetical evidence.
4To emphasize the oddness of a \coin rst" approach, note that on this view, two sequences of
toss outcomes describe the same world whenever one is a temporal shift of the other. Therefore,
any measurable set of uncentered worlds corresponds to a shift-invariant set of trajectories. Since
Bernoulli shifts are ergodic, any such set has extreme measure (i.e. measure zero or one) or fails to
be measurable (in the usual sense).
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will serve as an example.) Conditionalization on O raises the same trouble as the
gong; it seems that, conditional on O, one ought to be indierent between any two
possible displacements of one's position from that of the unique heads outcome.5
This phenomenon looks to be indigenous to conditionalization on shift-invariant N .
What we seek, then, is a shift invariant set of trajectories determined by the Coin's
past alone. Examples include the number of tails tosses in the past is nite and the
density of tails tosses in the past is zero. To pursue the latter example, let D be the
assertion that
lim
n!1
# heads in past n days
n
= lim
n!1
fn = 1:
Let  be the centered proposition that a certain n-tuple of toss outcomes will be
instantiated in the next n days' tosses, starting from today. Based on what reasons
for HALF have been oered (independence plus Principal Principle, for example),
its defenders will surely hold that Cr(jD) = 2 n. Let  n, meanwhile, be the
centered proposition that the same n-tuple of toss outcomes be instantiated in the
previous n days. By reasoning in the spirit of UPDATING, it seems that Cr(jD) =
Cr+n( njD) should hold, where Cr+n is the credence function that one will have
n days in the future. But by shift invariance of D, a strong case can be made that
also Cr( njD) = Cr+n( njD).
6 What that means, though, is that conditioning on
D yields the uniform distribution over the previous n tosses, for any n. Assuming
countable additivity of Cr(jD), one could now, in a few lines, reach the disastrous
conclusion Cr(:DjD) = 1.
One can indeed avoid this disaster by stipulating that Cr(HjD) = 1, but at high
cost. For even if one is willing to sacrice independence of the past and future tails,
it still seems wrong that one should put Cr(HjD) = 1 when D is a collection of pasts
ff for which there is nothing to defeat the presumption that Cr(Hjff) = 1
2
. Moreover
(since D is shift invariant and assuming Cr(HjD) = 1) countable additivity has the
unwelcome consequence that one ought to assign full credence, conditional on D, to
every toss (past, present and future) landing heads. Given the Coin's fairness, that
seems excessive.
For all this new take on the argument from evolving credences says, then, it may
well remain a live option to maintain Cr(HjD) = 1
2
and learn to live with mere nite
additivity of Cr(jD). Takers may nd comfort in that Cr(jD) will still be countably
additive over events generated by tosses later than n days ago, for any n; presumably,
5Conditionalization on P doesn't have this eect. Expressed in wildcard notation, P corresponds
to the set of sequences of the form : : : HHHH     : : :, where the rst wildcard  occurs in the
\today" position. So upon contemplating P , there isn't any \new point of reference" that you
become lost with respect to. You know exactly where you are relative to P 's features, namely at
the day of the rst toss that P fails to constrain.
6The reader will note a similarity to CONSTANCY, but also an important dierence: unlike P ,
D is shift invariant and so not less likely to hold at the later time.
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those are the tosses we care about. If that's right then any challenge to HALF must
come from elsewhere.7
2. Appendix: Arbitrary conditional credences?
In a well researched paper (2015) serving in part as a reply to Dorr, Wayne C.
Myrvold gives several fascinating examples of seemingly natural intuitions about
conditionalization on measure zero sets coming into conict with one another. But
he also writes of the Eternal coin that:
P (HjP)(u) = P (H) = 1
2
for almost all u in our event space. But this
doesn't preclude Dorr, or anyone else so inclined, from assigning the
value 1, or any other value, to the probability of H conditional on the
proposition P , or on any set of propositions comprising a set of measure
zero. Distinct choices of this sort yield the same probabilities for all
propositions about histories.
Here P is subjective probability (which we have been denoting Cr); the \event space"
is the space of all doubly innite fheads; tailsg-valued sequences. (We again take the
domain of these sequences to be the set of days, past present and future.) u ranges
over one-sided sequences (possible pasts), i.e. the atoms of P , the ff-algebra generated
by the propositions
pn: the coin landed heads n days ago.
Myrvold's contention is that the only constraints on Cr(HjP)(u)8 are collective con-
straints borne by the full set of possible pasts u. Specically, his position appears to
be that these are constrained by (and only by) the requirement that
Cr(H \ A) =
Z
A
Cr(HjP)(u) du for all P-measurable sets A: (1)
If Myrvold is right, then one cannot argue at all for Cr(HjP)(u) = 1
2
for any single
past.
We suggest, against this, that (assuming there is no explicit stipulation about null
event behavior, e.g. \the coin is such that if it has never landed heads in the past
then it will never land heads"), probabilities of the sort Cr(H\A) may in some cases
constrain even single values Cr(HjP)(u), albeit weakly. Specically:
7One possible line of attack is to run a version of the Borel-Kolmogorov paradox (in which it
is shown that, starting with the usual measure on the sphere, conditionalization on a great circle
is ambiguous; see e.g. Mryvold 2015) in sequence space. We give a brief sketch. First identify
(modulo null sets) the sequence space f0; 1gZ with the unit square, the negative and non-negative
coordinates being viewed as binary expansions of x and y respectively. P may now be identied
with the Eastern border of the square, and H with its upper half. Conditional on f(x; y) : x  yg,
H has measure 1
4
. Indeed, H has measure 1
4
conditional on any triangle with one vertex at (1; 1)
and facing side on the x-axis. So, there is reason to assume that H has measure 1
4
conditional on
any line segment connecting (1; 1) and the x-axis. But the Eastern border, i.e. P , is such a line
segment. We aren't sure that's enough ambiguity to overrule the Principal Principle, though.
8The notation Dorr employs, namely Cr(Hju), is technically ambiguous in that no ff-algebra is
specied. (See Myrvold (2015) for details.) Although Dorr surely had P in mind, only our response
to Myrvold requires the more precise notation.
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Convexity: Let u be a zero measure atom of P . To maintain that Cr(KjP)(u) = y 2
R on the basis of constraints on Cr alone, there must exist, for every neighborhood
N of y, a P-measurable set A such that Cr(KjA) 2 N .
To be clear, Convexity is intended as a supplement to the collective constraints (1).
(It is not a replacement!) At any rate...what can one say on behalf of Convexity?
Naively, Cr(KjP)(u) = y means that, were you to learn that u is the case, your
posterior in K would come to be y. Note, however, that there are no stipulations
regarding null event behavior (countably many such would not constrain Cr), and u
cannot be learned in nite time. In the coin toss example, this would involve checking
the results of countably many tosses; such a case is typical.
Where one can learn u only \by degrees", it is natural that Cr(KjP)(u) = y should at
least be consistent with the aforementioned naive sentiment. In other words, it should
imply that, were you to learn (by an innite sequence of P-measurable observations)
that u is the case, your posterior in K might come to be (i.e. approach) y. Failing this
condition, we see no way to ascribe to \Cr(KjP)(u) = y" any substantive meaning.
It is often assumed that the function Cr(KjP)() is only dened almost everywhere.
More precise would be to say that there are multiple ways to dene it, any two of
which are guaranteed to agree only almost everywhere. A typical construction: let
(Pn) be a generating sequence of progressively ner nite P-measurable partitions.
Letting un be the member of Pn containing u, put
Cr(KjP)(u) = lim
n
Cr(Kjun):
Such a denition assigns a unique value for every (not just almost every) u. (For some
null set of u where the limit doesn't exist, this \value" may be \does not exist".)
Of course if, you having carried out the above construction, we repeat it with a
dierent generating sequence of partitions (Qn), we may obtain Cr(KjP)(u) = y2
where you had Cr(KjP)(u) = y1 6= y2 (for some particular u or for some null set of
u). Even so, each of us would still mean \if one were to learn (asymptotically, by
means of our respective partition sequences) that u is the case, one's posterior in K
would come to be (in the limit) y", and both denitions would satisfy Convexity.
In the case of the Eternal coin, Cr(HjB) = 1
2
for every positive measure, P measur-
able set B, so Convexity requires Cr(HjP)(u) = 1
2
for every (not just almost every)
past u{which, we propose, is just what everyone knew all along.
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